I am writing this edition of the Mazz-INT blog in Tampa Florida where I am excited to be for the delayed version of GEOINT 13. As with past GEOINT’s I am looking forward to hearing from the leadership of the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding both the current state of the community and where it is going in the future as needs increase and resources diminish. I expect the CentCom and SoCom Commanders to expound as demanding users on what they need from the IC. I am also anxious to see in the GEOINT exhibition hall what new technologies the IC’s industrial base will have on display that can improve intelligence performance while reducing costs. Then there will be the free flow of networking between members of government and industry that is essential to building trust so that the IC can procure from the private sector efficiently and with confidence. This is something that often doesn’t happen in the national capital region because of the grind of daily schedules and the tyranny of traffic. Since the budgetary demise of DoDIIS and numerous other regional and agency specific “trade shows,” GEOINT takes on added importance of “keeping the lights on” as an open forum for the IC to communicate with and learn from all in industry who believe they have something of value to offer the IC for the defense of our nation. The Intelligence and National Security Summit coming up on 18-19 Sept and co-sponsored by AFCEA and INSA, is another event in this category.
Turning to some of those issues the IC is dealing with today in real time, I don’t believe any of us are surprised that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a fait acompli and the open question now is whether the eastern Ukraine will become federalized or fully incorporated by Moscow. Media reporting in April augmented by U.S. State Department and NATO warnings of “serious consequences” indicate those pro-Russians Ukrainian militias are storming government offices in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv. What is clear from events in March and so far in April is that neither the United States nor the major powers in the European Union have in combination sufficient power or the will to dissuade Vladimir Putin from acting on what he sees as Russian national interests in the Ukraine. Over time, of course, Russia’s actions to reattach the Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine by force will lead to Putin being “shunned” by the international community while on the economic front most will seek alternatives to doing business with or in Russia. Sounds like Russia before Peter the Great, but with ICBMS!
I also notice that to get the suspended Israeli-Palestinian peace talks back on track the idea of exchanging convicted Israeli spy Jay Pollard was floated to encourage the Netanyahu Government to make a meaningful concession to the Palestinians. I am not conversant enough with the positions of either Israel or Palestine to know what a meaningful comprise capable of advancing the moribund peace process would be, but I do know that I am tired of Pollard’s seemingly annual “15 minutes of fame” about why he should be released because he has served sufficient time for his crimes. NO HE HASN’T! But unlike most of my peers in Naval Intelligence I view Pollard as a diminishing asset who should be traded for concessions important to the United States (e.g. stop building settlements) while he still has trading value. Though I delight in the thought of Jay Pollard wasting away in quasi-solitary confinement in a North Carolina federal prison, I am at loss to see how this is advancing larger U.S. national security interests, which at least for me include holding Israel accountable for sponsoring his espionage. What actually concerns me the most, however, is the martyrdom of Pollard and the potential that he could be paroled on the basis of time served under current federal prison guidelines.
Speaking of Israel, did you see where former Air Force A2 Dave Deptula suggested transferring a few B-52G’s from the U.S.’s retired inventory to the Israeli Air Force as way of getting Iran’s attention to be serious in its negotiations about not pursuing nuclear weapons. I am sure many would see providing Israel this kind of strategic offensive reach as bordering on brinkmanship, but I know I like the way Dave is thinking. Of course, just reminding the Mullah’s in Tehran that this option exists should by itself refocus them on the value of negotiations and how a nuclear Iran changes the strategic calculation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
Come to think of it it’s probably time to remind Vladimir Putin as well as our NATO allies of the strategic reach of the United States as a Russian SU-24 fighter bomber buzzed the USS Daniel Cook while steaming on a freedom of navigation mission in the Black Sea. To complement ratcheting up economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea the U.S. Navy should be noticeably directed as result of the Daniel Cook incident on 14 April to deploy three medium to small amphibious ships protected by two Aegis equipped destroyers to the Black Sea for “familiarization ops” that would include a port call in Constanta, Romania. Then the AF could covertly circumnavigate the Black Sea with a B-2 Spirit and if Russian Air Defense did not detect the flight the White House could release undisputable evidence of this mission to embarrass President Putin’s ability to protect Russia from U.S. strategic forces.
Finally, I want to touch on the Heartbleed issue which raises the difficult question about the whether the IC should be warning U.S. entities (corporations and individuals) outside of government to threats that endanger their security and wellbeing. Some will recall that post 9/11 the question was raised but not answered because it was moot as to whether or not the IC should risk sensitive sources and methods to protect the American flying public with warnings of creditable threats to hijack commercial airliners. Here the question is about whether NSA and/or DHS should be more interested in exploiting cyber vulnerabilities like Heartbleed or more concerned about protecting American citizens from economic if not physical harm from dangerous malware. In today’s current environment of the public’s diminished confidence and trust in the IC the answer seems to be a “no brainer” for me at least. The IC needs to be actively seeking opportunities where it can demonstrate not what it is doing “to” the American people (i.e. collecting of their telephone metadata without a warrant) but what intelligence can do “for” all Americans to insure that they have the opportunity to enjoy “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness!”
That’s what I think; what do you think?