The “New Normal” and DIA

It is Memorial Day and I am surprised by how inured I am to our military being at war for 13 years now.  I am careful to say the military rather than the nation being at war, because since 9/11 two very different two-term Presidents have as a matter of policy made the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan the sole purview of the armed forces vice the nation they are protecting.  It seems to me that in different ways both the Bush and Obama Administrations reached the same political calculation: if the American people have to sacrifice in terms of higher taxes, reduced entitlements or less consumer goods they will quickly use their voting power to end these conflicts. Now the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have come to an end out of wearing frustration and crushing expense with results that don’t seem to have made the United States any safer.  This is especially true when we consider what a small group of passionately anti-American terrorists operating from a failed state can do with kinetic, chemical/biological, or cyber weapons of mass destruction.  We have, however, demonstrated what terrorists can expect should they bring harm to the homeland of the United States.

It is in this context I am viewing the news of the world in a state of constant crisis as being the “new normal,” from the coup in Thailand, Boko Haram taking 200 school girls hostage, continuing armed conflict in Syria, escalating violence in Iraq, political upheaval in Egypt, instability in Pakistan, events in the Ukraine, or the confrontation in the South China Sea.  In all of his public appearances for the past year or so Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director LTG Mike Flynn has been warning that crisis is the “new normal” and implying that solid intelligence is the capability most in need by policy makers and military operators for sorting out which world events present serious security threats to the interests of the United States and how to effectively deal with them.  In other words, putting this daily menu of crises into context so that national energy and resources can be effectively engaged against those that matter the most. And when force is employed by providing military commanders with decision advantage.

Given his Special Operations Forces (SOF) background and his description and prescription for what is wrong with military intelligence in his seminal 2010 paper “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan”,  I was not surprised by Mike Flynn’s aggressive efforts through personnel and organizational change to make DIA more relevant to decision makers and military officers dealing with constant crisis.  I was surprised, however, that for reasons not clear to me he was not continued for a normal third year of his tour as DIA Director because according to press reports he was disruptive!  Really?  So what was the DoD and IC leadership who selected him to lead DIA expecting from a person this transparent?

DIA was established in 1961 to provide the Secretary of Defense and the wider defense enterprise with timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence to support policy, acquisition, and operations. DIA was also seen as adding to the competitive analysis of intelligence offered by the military services State Department and the CIA.  Nonetheless, DIA has struggled throughout its history to establish itself on an equal professional footing with the CIA and the other four national intelligence agencies (NSA, NRO, NGA, and FBI).  Since the mid-1990’s I have observed Flynn’s seven  predecessors become DIA Director with a mandate and/or agenda to revive DIA and make it a more meaningful player for DoD’s needs and by extension give it influence within the larger Intelligence Community (IC) commensurate with its mission and size.  In their own ways each of these well thought of three star officers achieved incremental success in modernizing and equipping DIA for the post-Cold War Intelligence challenges DoD, the IC and the nation faced.  In aggregate, though, none of these seven directors significantly changed how DIA was perceived externally by its consumers or IC peers; nor did they impact how DIA is internally viewed by its own workforce.

When Mike Flynn became Director DIA in July 2012 it seemed to me his approach for changing DIA was employing a quick hitting “SOF raid” where he and a cadre of trusted subordinates in short order shifted over 100 SES’s to new positions (detaching most from their bureaucratic power bases) while also reorganizing DIA out of its hierarchical structure to a flatter more fluid “centers” based approached driven by consumer needs.  In retrospect what LTG Flynn misgauged was that as a bureaucratically hardened target with practiced survival skills DIA was not a good SOF target.  In the end it seems DIA’s entrenched ways attrited Flynn’s more agile but smaller force before he could change DIA’s organizational outlook.  DIA’s change-resistant culture also got some serious top cover from the military service intelligence organizations that see gains for DIA as working against their prestige and budgets.  Similarly, CIA has no interest in DIA becoming a meaningful counterweight on the military side to its role as the IC’s leading all source intelligence producer.

I suspect Mike Flynn understood that there were long odds against dramatically changing DIA on his watch, but doing a risk verses benefit calculation I can see where he saw virtually only personal danger to himself and unlimited upside if the effort to make DIA more relevant to the “new normal” environment of continuing crisis succeeded. Presumably, whoever the next DirDIA is they will be informed by LTG Flynn’s experience of attempting to rapidly alter DIA and return to a path of incremental change for the agency.

Here are some recommendations I hope the next DIA Director will consider as this officer assesses the direction they want DIA to move in:

  • No reorganizations; play the cards you are dealt so the DIA workforce will stop being concerned about organization charts and be more focused producing intelligence.  Moreover, continuing the DIA “Centers” will allow the agency to avoid the disruptive ad hoc task force response to crises that it has traditionally used.
  • The quickest path to relevance is through tailored embedded (virtual where this makes sense) intelligence support teams for military operating forces going in harm’s way.  DIA “go teams” that train up with SOF, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units they are supporting will provide these units with better intelligence while infusing DIA at the working level with what military forces need and how they want it.
  • Avoid becoming “cyber warriors” but develop a deeper understanding of collection, analysis, signatures, and order of battle associate with the cyber domain.  What should the Modernized Intelligence Data Base (MIDB) look like for cyber targets?
  • Intelligence support to DoD acquisition is under served and is in the sweet spot of DIA’s capabilities and strengths.  Begin to view intelligence for acquisition as supporting the next generation of warfighters.
  • Information Technology (IT) is an “enabler” but not a core mission for DIA so stop spending so much time and money on it!  Shift to an outsourced managed services model similar to Ground Breaker to both save money and improve IT infrastructure performance.  Turn DIA to being an IT consumer/follower vice developer/innovator.  Leverage IT capabilities offered by ICITE, DI2E, and DISA

In the final analysis it doesn’t matter if DIA becomes a more relevant IC player through revolutionary or evolutionary change.  The radical organizational change and sense of urgency LTG Flynn has introduced into DIA, I believe will provide the next DirDIA a platform to help DIA through an incremental approach to achieving its true potential

That’s what I think; what do you think?

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Live from GEOINT in Tampa

I am writing this edition of the Mazz-INT blog in Tampa Florida where I am excited to be for the delayed version of GEOINT 13.  As with past GEOINT’s I am looking forward to hearing from the leadership of the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding both the current state of the community and where it is going in the future as needs increase and resources diminish.  I expect the CentCom and SoCom Commanders to expound as demanding users on what they need from the IC.  I am also anxious to see in the GEOINT exhibition hall what new technologies the IC’s industrial base will have on display that can improve intelligence performance while reducing costs.  Then there will be the free flow of networking between members of government and industry that is essential to building trust so that the IC can procure from the private sector efficiently and with confidence.  This is something that often doesn’t happen in the national capital region because of the grind of daily schedules and the tyranny of traffic.  Since the budgetary demise of DoDIIS and numerous other regional and agency specific “trade shows,” GEOINT takes on added importance of “keeping the lights on” as an open forum for the IC to communicate with and learn from all in industry who believe they have something of value to offer the IC for the defense of our nation.  The Intelligence and National Security Summit coming up on 18-19 Sept and co-sponsored by AFCEA and INSA, is another event in this category.

Turning to some of those issues the IC is dealing with today in real time, I don’t believe any of us are surprised that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a fait acompli and the open question now is whether the eastern Ukraine will become federalized or fully incorporated by Moscow.  Media reporting in April augmented by U.S. State Department and NATO warnings of “serious consequences” indicate those pro-Russians Ukrainian militias are storming government offices in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv.  What is clear from events in March and so far in April is that neither the United States nor the major powers in the European Union have in combination sufficient power or the will to dissuade Vladimir Putin from acting on what he sees as Russian national interests in the Ukraine.  Over time, of course, Russia’s actions to reattach the Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine by force will lead to Putin being “shunned” by the international community while on the economic front most will seek alternatives to doing business with or in Russia.  Sounds like Russia before Peter the Great, but with ICBMS!

I also notice that to get the suspended Israeli-Palestinian peace talks back on track the idea of exchanging convicted Israeli spy Jay Pollard was floated to encourage the Netanyahu Government to make a meaningful concession to the Palestinians.  I am not conversant enough with the positions of either Israel or Palestine to know what a meaningful comprise capable of advancing the moribund peace process would be, but I do know that I am tired of Pollard’s seemingly annual “15 minutes of fame” about why he should be released because he has served sufficient time for his crimes.  NO HE HASN’T!  But unlike most of my peers in Naval Intelligence I view Pollard as a diminishing asset who should be traded for concessions important to the United States (e.g. stop building settlements) while he still has trading value. Though I delight in the thought of Jay Pollard wasting away in quasi-solitary confinement in a North Carolina federal prison, I am at loss to see how this is advancing larger U.S. national security interests, which at least for me include holding Israel accountable for sponsoring his espionage.  What actually concerns me the most, however, is the martyrdom of Pollard and the potential that he could be paroled on the basis of time served under current federal prison guidelines.

Speaking of Israel, did you see where former Air Force A2 Dave Deptula suggested transferring a few B-52G’s from the U.S.’s retired inventory to the Israeli Air Force as way of getting Iran’s attention to be serious in its negotiations about not pursuing nuclear weapons.  I am sure many would see providing Israel this kind of strategic offensive reach as bordering on brinkmanship, but I know I like the way Dave is thinking.  Of course, just reminding the Mullah’s in Tehran that this option exists should by itself refocus them on the value of negotiations and how a nuclear Iran changes the strategic calculation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Come to think of it it’s probably time to remind Vladimir Putin as well as our NATO allies of the strategic reach of the United States as a Russian SU-24 fighter bomber buzzed the USS Daniel Cook while steaming on a freedom of navigation mission in the Black Sea.  To complement ratcheting up economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea the U.S. Navy should be noticeably directed as result of the Daniel Cook incident on 14 April to deploy three medium to small amphibious ships protected by two Aegis equipped destroyers to the Black Sea for “familiarization ops” that would include a port call in Constanta, Romania. Then the AF could covertly circumnavigate the Black Sea with a B-2 Spirit and if Russian Air Defense did not detect the flight the White House could release undisputable evidence of this mission to embarrass President Putin’s ability to protect Russia from U.S. strategic forces.

Finally, I want to touch on the Heartbleed issue which raises the difficult question about the whether the IC should be warning U.S. entities (corporations and individuals) outside of government to threats that endanger their security and wellbeing.  Some will recall that post 9/11 the question was raised but not answered because it was moot as to whether or not the IC should risk sensitive sources and methods to protect the American flying public with warnings of creditable threats to hijack commercial airliners.  Here the question is about whether NSA and/or DHS should be more interested in exploiting cyber vulnerabilities like Heartbleed or more concerned about protecting  American citizens from economic if not physical harm from dangerous malware.  In today’s current environment of the public’s diminished confidence and trust in the IC the answer seems to be a “no brainer” for me at least.  The IC needs to be actively seeking opportunities where it can demonstrate not what it is doing “to” the American people (i.e. collecting of their telephone metadata without a warrant) but what intelligence can do “for” all Americans to insure that they have the opportunity to enjoy “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness!”

That’s what I think; what do you think?

The Future is Now?

There is no doubt that the situation in the Ukraine where Russian political and economic interests are pitted against those of Western Europe, and by extension to the U.S., is the most serious confrontation with Russia since the war in Kosovo.

I am amused, however, by the dust-up during the first week in March about whether the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) provided adequate and timely warning that Putin would insert military force into the Crimea.  A vague sense of history coupled with “breaking news stories” should have told anyone even casually following events in Kiev that once Putin’s cohort President Viktor Yanukovych  was pushed from power there was a strong likelihood that Russia would use military force to “stabilize” the situation in what it believes is its sphere of influence.  Russia’s modern history of military intervention in its near abroad, whether under the Brezhnev Doctrine or otherwise, is long and undistinguished:  Hungry (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1980) Afghanistan (1979), Chechnya (1994 & 2000), and Georgia (2008).

Don’t get me wrong: I am not saying that the IC didn’t warn; to the contrary, I agree completely with DNI Clapper’s observation that we have all seen real intelligence failures and the IC’s coverage and warnings regarding developments in the Ukraine were timely and appropriate (http://www.wtop.com/215/3577171/Clapper-Ukraine-intelligence-not-a-failure).  Moreover, policy makers and military commanders did not have to rely on intelligence reports only as there were also plenty of warnings about Russia moving against Crimea in the media.  How many of you without access to classified intelligence reporting were surprised by Russian forces showing into Crimea without resistance?

Given the “common wisdom” of both the intelligence and open source reporting about the Ukraine and the Crimea, if I were the J2 at EUCOM I hope that I would have detailed an analyst or two to ferret out the indicators that the Russians would not move militarily into the Ukraine to make sure that the CoCom’s intel team could provide the staff with a balanced view of events and options based on intelligence empiricals.  If any intelligence service was surprised, though, it appears to be Putin’s who failed to see the strategic direction that political events in the Ukraine were taking.

Nonetheless, any controversy about U.S. IC warning performance post-Yanukovych’s departure just diverts attention from the hard problems facing the IC on the Ukraine.  There are at least two parallel but related issues I believe policy makers need immediate accurate intelligence on.  The first is who are the likely new political leaders in Kiev and are they capable of governing?  There is also the question of what form any “opposition” will take in the new Ukrainian government.  The second is what is Putin likely to do next?  Is the annexation of Crimea by Russia now inevitable?  If it is, what does that mean for the region?  If it is not what can be done to prevent the Crimea from becoming Russian territory again? Following close behind the importance of political developments in Kiev and the Crimea will be salient intelligence regarding the views of allies, neutrals, and adversaries in the region.  What policy makers won’t need is IC inputs on Putin’s potential course of actions, but rather insights from unique intelligence sources (i.e. real secrets) regarding what actions he is likely to take and the reactions they will cause in Kiev, Moscow, Brussels, Berlin, Ankara, Tehran,  Beijing, and whatever cave Ayman al-Zawahiri is operating from.

As the IC rallies to provide predictive intelligence on the Ukrainian situation it should be able to slew remote technical collection to the region, but the IC will find its tactical focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 means it won’t have collectors or analysts as familiar with their targets as they would like or need to be.  The IC will need to accept the reality that there is no “fast forward” button for experience.  Certainly we won’t have the HUMINT capability in place to provide its unique perspective on unfolding events – – – particularly who’s in and who’s out in Ukrainian domestic politics. Additionally the “rebalance to the Pacific” of US national security policy is at least a short term casualty as Defense, State, and the IC focus on the Ukraine while we continue working the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

Ironically, Russia introducing forces into the Crimea 72 hours before the release of the President’s Defense Budget for FY 2015 served to make the budget look as if it is detached from reality and un-executable.  Secretary of Defense Hagel’s position is that the budget assumes prudent risks now (i.e. cuts in force strength) so that the U.S. military can be a more balanced, capable, and ready in the future.  Current events in Crimea, along with China’s maritime aggressiveness in the South and East China Seas, North Korea’s continuing threat to stability in East Asia, Al Qaeda’s resurgence, and Iran’s unclear nuclear ambitions, however, are all shouting “the future is now.”

That’s what I think; what do you think?